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Many have expressed concern about the financial stability of the U.S. corpo-
rate sector. This concern stems, in part, from the increased leverage involved
in a steady stream of well-publicized mergers, leveraged buyouts, and other
corporate restructurings and, in part, from recent defaults. Indeed, aggregate
statistics indicate significant increases over the 1980s in net equity retirements
and issuance of debt securities. Aggregate ratios of debt outstanding to assets
and of interest expense to operating cash flow, computed on the basis of book-
value statistics, also have risen steadily for the nonfinancial corporate sector.
In a paper published in 1988, "Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?," Ben S.
Bernanke and John Y. Campbell examine these and several other indicators of
the financial stability of U.S. nonfinancial corporations in great detail. Ber-
nanke and Campbell rely on samples culled from the COMPUSTAT files, which
contain historical data on the balance sheets and income statements of individ-
ual large nonfinancial corporations. They also adjust book values to market
values, whenever appropriate and possible. Their sample period extends from
1969 through 1986.
This paper expands on the work by Bernanke and Campbell in several
ways. First, the sample period is extended through 1988, and thus incorpo-
rates the massive restructuring of balance sheets done in 1987 and 1988. Sec-
ond, the sample is enlarged to include small corporations and corporations
that have disappeared over the years owing to mergers, private buyouts, and
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bankruptcy. Third, a measure of financial stability not reported by Bernanke
and Campbell, the median bond rating, is examined here. Finally, a simpler
and more accurate method of converting the book value into the market value
of debt than employed by Bernanke and Campbell is used in this paper. In
other respects, including the primary measures examined and the primary
methodologies used, however, this paper follows the work by Bernanke and
Campbell rather closely.'
6.1 Summary of Paper by Bernanke and Campbell
Instead of relying on aggregate statistics based on book values, Bernanke
and Campbell compute indicators, based on market values, for samples of
large nonfinancial corporations culled from the COMPUSTAT files. They ad-
dress, in particular, the question of how the mean and the upper tail of the
distribution of the debt-asset ratio, at market value, has evolved over the pe-
riod 1969-86. The upper tail of this distribution is thought to be more relevant
to concerns about bankruptcy risk than average measures based on broad
book-value aggregates.
Bernanke and Campbell also examine other measures of the financial health
of the corporate sector. The distributions of indicators of liquidity, such as the
ratios of interest expense to operating cash flow and of interest expense to
current assets, are computed for the samples. The authors investigate the de-
gree to which changes in aggregate debt are related to changes in industry
composition to ascertain whether industry effects have been an important part
of recent aggregate financial behavior. They also estimate a formal model of
the determinants of debt-asset ratios to determine whether recent patterns of
debt issuance fit the estimated relationship or whether debt issuance has been
unusual relative to model expectations. Finally, the authors study how reces-
sions such as those of 1973-74 and 1981-82 would affect the financial struc-
tures of the sample of firms if such recessions took place after 1986.
Although the evidence is decidedly mixed, Bernanke and Campbell choose
to emphasize two pieces of evidence suggesting that it is appropriate to be
concerned about trends in corporate finance during the 1980s. Measures of
corporate liquidity, in particular, the ratio of interest expense to operating cash
flow, have deteriorated. And, more significantly, a simulation shows that a
recession like that of 1973-74 would lead to debt-asset ratios of unprece-
dented levels, implying bankruptcy for more than 10 percent of the sample of
firms. In contrast, however, other evidence suggests a less negative view of
recent corporate financial behavior. In the sample of firms examined for
1969-86, there is little upward trend in the mean ratio of debt to assets,
whether measured at book or market values. The upper percentiles of distri-
bution of this ratio also do not seem to indicate any significant deterioration
in financial structure. In particular, the large increases in equity values during
the 1980s led to increases in the denominator of the debt-asset ratio; increases209 Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?
in debt outstanding were therefore supported fully by increased asset values.
The stability in debt-asset ratios holds true, whether the industrial composi-
tion of the sample is allowed to change or is fixed at 1969-74 or 1986 values,
or whether oil-related industries are included or excluded. Furthermore, the
model of the determinants of debt indicates that the growth in debt over the
1980s is well explained by the economic variables in the model and has not
been unusual in that sense.
6.2 Methodological Contributions of the Bernanke-Campbell Paper
The main contributions of the paper by Bernanke and Campbell are the
extensive use of a segment of the COMPUSTAT data base, the calculation of
market values of debt, and simulations of the impact of recession on corporate
financial structure. Using the "Industrial" COMPUSTAT file, and after eliminat-
ing financial corporations and firms with missing essential data, Bernanke and
Campbell produce a sample that starts with about 650 firms in 1969 and grows
to some 1,400 firms by 1986. They call this sample, which excludes firms
that were later acquired or went bankrupt or private, the "growing sample."
Data for the initial 650 firms were available consistently throughout the
sample period; this "fixed sample" thus excludes firms that came into exis-
tence over the period as well as those that were acquired or went bankrupt or
private. In general, Bernanke and Campbell report results based on the grow-
ing sample, although they indicate that there is little difference if the results
are based on the fixed sample. There is some question about how representa-
tive are the corporations in either the fixed or growing samples. The Industrial
file includes only large well-capitalized corporations whose stock is traded on
the NYSE or AMEX and, hence, excludes smaller firms. Furthermore, owing
to the exclusion of firms that were acquired or went bankrupt or private, the
samples might exhibit a survivorship bias that could lead to an understatement
of debt-asset ratios.
The second contribution of the paper is the computation of the market value
of debt for a large sample of firms over a substantial period of time. Bernanke
and Campbell claim that it is the market value of debt that is significant to
evaluating the riskiness of financial structure, because "firms can always refi-
nance existing debt at current interest rates, thereby effectively redeeming
their outstanding debt at the market value" (p. 97).
Bernanke and Campbell employ an algorithm first created by William
Brainard, John Shoven, and Lawrence Weiss (1980) to calculate the market
value of debt. It is assumed that the market value of short-term debt and other
current liabilities equals the book value. The algorithm also assumes that, at
the starting date of the analysis, the maturity distribution of each firm's long-
term debt equals the aggregate average distribution of long-term debt in the
corporate sector for that date. The aggregate average distribution is computed
from historical statistics on past debt issuance in the corporate sector, using210 Mark J. Warshawsky
the assumption that bonds with 20-year maturities were issued exclusively.
After the starting year, the maturity distribution for each firm is updated under
the assumption that, if net issuance for the firm is positive, new issues have a
20-year maturity and that, if net issuance is negative, net retirements apply to
all outstanding issues proportionately. Net issuance for each firm is obtained
as the change in the total book value of long-term debt, adjusted for maturing
issues. The impact of calls, conversions, and other early retirements on the
maturity distribution is ignored.
The authors modify the basic algorithm to use information available after
1974 for some firms on the COMPUSTAT files concerning the maturity dis-
tribution of long-term debt out to five years' maturity. They replace the first
five years of the maturity distribution produced by the basic algorithm with
the COMPUSTAT numbers, scaling the remainder of the distribution produced
by the basic algorithm up or down in proportion to remain consistent with the
COMPUSTAT number on total long-term debt. The modified distribution is then
carried forward to the next year and updated by the modified algorithm.
Once the maturity distribution of long-term debt for each firm is obtained,
the algorithm assumes that each issue has a coupon rate equal to the Baa rate
at the time of issue and a yield to maturity equal to the current Baa rate. The
last assumption is equivalent to a market value given by a simple present-value
calculation and to assuming that the yield curve is flat. The effects of upgrad-
ing or downgrading of bond ratings over time, the actual debt rating when
bonds were issued, and of convertibility into stock are ignored.
The impact of call provisions on market prices of bonds also are ignored by
Bernanke and Campbell. Utilities are generally constrained by covenants
from calling bonds prior to the fifth year after issuance. Industrial firms typi-
cally are constrained for ten years. In the sixth (or eleventh) year, however,
firms can call bonds at or slightly above par value. Hence, when current inter-
est rates are lower than coupon rates, the issuer is likely to call older bonds,
thereby limiting prices of these bonds to the call price. Therefore, the "mar-
ket" value of debt produced by Bernanke and Campbell using a simple
present-value computation likely exaggerates the "up-side" changes in the
true market value of newly issued and, certainly, of older bonds when interest
rates decline.
The third main contribution of the Bernanke and Campbell paper is to cal-
culate the effect of simulated recessions on current debt-asset ratios, valued at
market. For each firm that existed in the base years, 1972 or 1980, Bernanke
and Campbell computed the percentage changes in the total market value of
the firm (debt and equity) that were observed (in the market or by algorithm)
over the two succeeding years. They applied these changes to the denominator
of the debt-asset ratio extant in 1986. Instead of applying percentage changes
to the numerator, however, Bernanke and Campbell employed a more elabo-
rate technique to simulate the market value of debt in hypothetical recession211 Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?
years following 1986. They assumed that the book value of debt will change
by the amount it changed in 1973-74 or 1981-82, and then adjusted the
change for growth in corporate assets through 1986. They also simulated the
maturity structure of the firm's debt over the hypothetical recession years,
using the Bernanke-Campbell algorithm discussed above. Employing the his-
torical percentage changes in interest rates from the appropriate recession, the
market value of debt was calculated for each firm in two hypothetical years
following 1986. Combining these simulations of market values of debt and of
assets, debt-asset ratios were created.
A very dramatic deterioration in debt-asset ratios occurs in the simula-
tion of the 1973-74 recession. During 1973-74, the total market value of
COMPUSTAT firms dropped sharply. For the simulation, 10 percent of the firms
in the sample have debt-asset ratios exceeding unity, indicating financial
trouble. In 1986, firms have higher debt-asset ratios than they had in 1972,
and hence are more severely affected by a given drop in total market value
than they were in 1973-74. In the 1981-82 recession, by contrast, the stock
market was relatively stable and interest rates were high, leading to little de-
terioration in simulated debt-asset ratios. The very severe results of the 1973-
74 simulation, to some extent, come directly from the methodology em-
ployed; the denominator of the ratio is changed in simple percentage terms,
while the numerator is altered by an elaborately computed change.
Simulations of the ratios of interest expense to operating cash flow and of
interest expense to current assets also were done for the two recession scena-
rios. Bernanke and Campbell took observed changes in earnings and current
assets from the historical recessions and scaled them up by the book value of
the firm's assets. They used the book-into-market algorithm to estimate inter-
est expenses. In both simulated recessions, the liquidity measures deteriorate;
in some instances, the measures deteriorate sharply.
6.3 Improvements Presented in This Paper
Although the paper by Bernanke and Campbell represents a significant ad-
vance over other empirical papers in the corporate finance literature, I believe
that improvements can be made in the sample and the algorithm used for com-
puting market values of debt. Furthermore, information about average Stan-
dard and Poor's (S&P) bond ratings is available and can be used and shown.
These improvements might lead to broader applicability and greater realism
in the results, although it is difficult to know a priori whether they would tend
to buttress or weaken the conclusions drawn by Bernanke and Campbell.
Regarding the sample, COMPUSTAT files for 1987 and 1988 are now avail-
able, enabling analysis on the impact of additional restructuring activity. In
addition, the "Full Coverage" and "Research" COMPUSTAT files are available,
enabling the analysis to include, respectively, smaller corporations whose212 Mark J. Warshawsky
stocks are traded on the NASDAQ and regional exchanges, and corporations
which disappeared by being acquired or by going bankrupt or private. In par-
ticular, the issue of survivorship bias can be studied.
Initially I also thought that significant improvements could be made to the
market-value-of-debt algorithm used by Bernanke and Campbell by making
several adjustments. Foremost among the adjustments was the utilization of
information available on COMPUSTAT for years after 1978 on representative
S&P bond ratings. For the years prior to 1978 it was assumed that each new
bond issue has a coupon rate equal to the rate prevailing at the time of issue
on a bond with the corporation's 1978 bond rating. After 1978 the rate at the
time of issue on a bond with the corporation's then-current bond rating was
used. Also, a rough modification of the simple present-value calculation of
market value was made to account for the existence of call provisions in bond
covenants. The pricing effect of call provisions was proxied by placing an
upper limit of $115 on bond prices produced by the algorithm. Another im-
provement attempted was the use of firm-specific information in 1988 on the
actual maturity distribution of long-term debt; preliminary experimentation
with this information, however, did not show significant differences from the
results of Bernanke and Campbell, who used the average aggregate maturity
distribution in 1969 as initial values in their algorithm.
The extent of the improvement that can be made by these adjustments in the
Bernanke-Campbell book-into-market algorithm is shown in table 6.1. For
the period 1979-87, the book values of long-term debt of Wool worth and
Alcoa reported in Standard and Poor's Bond Guide are shown. Also given are
the actual market values of the long-term debt for these companies reported in
the Bond Guide, and estimated market values computed under (a) the adjusted
algorithm and (b) the original algorithm used by Bernanke and Campbell.
2
The estimates using the adjusted algorithm of the market values of bonds for
these companies are closer to the actual market values than Bernanke and
Campbell's estimates. This improvement primarily owes, at least in the cases
of Wool worth and Alcoa, to the placement of an upper limit on bond prices.
Nevertheless, neither set of estimates captures fully the steep decline in bond
prices in 1981; moreover, neither algorithm can capture the depressed market
value of Alcoa's convertible bonds over the 1979-87 period resulting from a
depressed price for Alcoa's shares. More generally, no simple book-into-
market algorithm can replicate changing maturity distributions or value effec-
tively convertible debt or other debt contracts with equity features; at some
point, a more accurate research approach may be to simply obtain information
on the actual market value of individual bonds.
In the absence of complete historical data on the market value of individual
bonds (which, in any case, would not be available for privately placed bonds),
however, another simple approach can be employed and compared to the ad-
justed algorithm. This simple approach entails the application to each com-
pany's long-term debt of the ratio of market to par value of all corporate bonds213 Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?
Table 6.1
Year
Comparison of Calculations of Market Value of Debt








































































































Source: Standard and Poor's Bond Guide and author's calculations.
traded on the NYSE.
3 At year-end 1988, a total of 2,259 U.S. corporate debt
issues were listed on the NYSE by 793 issuers. The par value of these domes-
tic corporate bonds totaled $294.5 billion and the market value was $243.6
billion. The advantages of this simple aggregate approach are the utilization
of actual, not simulated, market values, and the ability to track exactly broad
macroeconomic trends. The main drawback, of course, is the discarding of
information specific to each individual company's debt structure and bond
rating.
The accuracy of the adjusted algorithm and the simple aggregate approach
are compared in table 6.2. (A fortiori, the accuracy of the original Bernanke-
Campbell algorithm is also being compared.) The mean squared error of esti-
mates of market values of bonds calculated under the adjusted algorithm and
the aggregate approach are shown for twelve companies for the years 1979
through 1988. The mean squared error was smaller for the adjusted algorithm214 Mark J. Warshawsky
Table 6.2 Comparison of Adjusted Algorithm and Aggregate Approach to













































in only three of the twelve cases; over all companies, the mean squared error
is smaller for the aggregate approach than for the adjusted algorithm. Hence,
the aggregate approach will be used exclusively in the calculations of the ratio
of debt to assets, at market value, reported below.
4 The historical ratio of mar-
ket to par value of NYSE-listed bonds is shown in figure 6.1.
6.4 Construction of the Samples
As Bernanke and Campbell did, I created two samples of corporations
listed on the COMPUSTAT files. The first fixed sample consists of 828 domestic
nonfinancial corporations for which data are available for each year from 1969
through 1988. Of the 828 corporations, 701 come from the Industrial
COMPUSTAT file and 127 from the Full Coverage file. The second fluctuating
sample consists of all corporations for which data on key variables were avail-
able for any year from 1969 through 1988. The total number of corporations
grew from 2,468 in 1969 to 5,120 in 1987. Of the 5,120 corporations in 1987,
1,676 appeared on the Industrial file, 2,908 on the Full Coverage file, and 536
on the Research file. The number of companies dropped to 4,523 in 1988,
owing mainly to fewer companies listed on the Research file. Also, I used the
September 1989 COMPUSTAT tapes; because some corporations' fiscal years
end later than December 31 and because from the end of the fiscal year to the
time COMPUSTAT enters annual statement variables as much as eight months
can elapse, fewer companies are listed on the Industrial and Full Coverage
files in 1988 than in 1987.
5 The number of corporations listed in the Full215 Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?
Coverage files grew particularly quickly over the 1969 through 1988 period,
consistent with the growth in listings on the NASDAQ over the period. The
number of corporations listed on the Research file grew slowly through 1976
and then declined through 1988. Because historical data on a disappeared
company can be included on the Research file only up to the year of the com-
pany's disappearance, it is sensible that the number of companies for which
data appear on the Research file declines rapidly in recent years as the active
history of the companies disappearing since 1969 recedes in time.
6.5 Distribution of Debt-Asset Ratios
Various perspectives on the debt-asset ratios for 1969-88 in various
samples are shown in the next three tables. The ratios are calculated using the
aggregate approach to calculating the market value of debt as described above,
actual market values of common equity, and the approach used by Bernanke
and Campbell to evaluate preferred equity. Assets equal the sum of debt and
equity.
Debt-asset ratios for the fixed sample, shown in table 6.3, are calculated,
as well, for the Industrial and Full Coverage subsamples. Three diiferent sta-
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Fig. 6.1. The ratio of market to par value of NYSE-listed corporate bonds

































































































































































































































Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations.
aAt market values.
median, and the ninetieth percentile. Over the entire period, for all statistics
and all subsamples, the debt-asset ratio rose. Companies on the Full Coverage
file exhibit consistently higher debt-asset ratios than companies on the Indus-
trial file. The former companies experienced a particularly notable increase in
the ratio in 1988, owing largely to the restructuring of a few companies in the
subsample. While the significant increases in debt-asset ratios in 1973 and
1974 are due primarily to the large drop in equity prices that occurred over
that period, and the steady decline in the ratios through 1983 results from
increases in equity prices, the small climb in the ratios since 1983 occurred
despite further significant increases in equity prices. Because the ratio of mar-
ket to par value for bonds in 1988 was nearly identical to the market-par ratio
in 1983, the overall rise in the debt-asset ratio since 1983 must have been
caused by the considerable issuance of debt and retirement of equity securities
through 1988. The statistic on ninetieth percentile indicates that some com-
panies, particularly those in the 1988 Full Coverage subsample, are operating
very close to "market value insolvency," which would occur when the ratio
equals one.
The same perspectives on debt-asset ratios are offered in table 6.4 for theooeN-^-enTi-esin —
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fluctuating sample. This second sample includes growing subsamples from
the Industrial and Full Coverage files and a shrinking subsample from the
Research file. The results are similar in a broad way to those in table 6.3. The
debt-asset ratio for the fluctuating sample rose during 1969-88, although less
significantly than in the fixed sample. The climb in the ratio from 1983
through 1988, in particular, is less noticeable than in the fixed sample. The
Full Coverage growing subsample has a lower debt-asset ratio than its fixed
subsample counterpart. Apparently, newly listed small companies have lower
debt-asset ratios than well-established small companies. By contrast, disap-
peared companies tend to have slightly higher debt-asset ratios than existing
companies, perhaps owing to bankruptcy as one of the causes of disappear-
ance. The survivorship bias, however, does not seem particularly significant.
Debt-asset ratios by industry for selected years are shown in table 6.5. The
ratios vary widely by industry, with chemicals, mining, and printing and pub-
lishing showing consistently low debt-asset ratios, and petroleum and natural


































































































































































































































Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations.
aDebt-asset ratio shown is the median of the distribution, calculated at market values. The sample does
not match that in table 6.4 exactly, owing to the omission of a few small industries.219 Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?
gas, construction, transportation, and utilities showing consistently high ra-
tios. The industries exhibiting the largest increase in debt-asset ratios over the
period include petroleum refining, retail, lumber and furniture, glass and con-
crete, apparel, and metal products. Petroleum refining and retail industries
have been prominently involved in merger, restructuring, and buyout activity.
The widely asked question about the relationship between the cyclical risk
and the leverage of an industry can be answered by regressing the debt-asset
ratio on the variability of detrended industry profits. If the coefficient on the
variability factor in such an equation is negative, the intuitive result is implied:
lower cyclical risk allows higher leverage. If, however, a counterintuitive zero
or positive coefficient is discovered, it would seem that leverage is influenced
by other factors more significant than cyclical risk, including, perhaps, tax
and regulatory structures, typical company size in the industry, and agency
considerations. The dependent variable for a simple cross-section equation
which I estimated is the debt-asset ratio, averaged over the three-year period,
1984-86, for each of the twenty-four industries shown in table 6.5. The in-
dependent variables are a constant and 1 less than the R
2 computed for profit
equations estimated separately for the twenty-four industries over the years
1969-86. The only variable included in these industry profit equations is a
simple time trend. The equation estimated over the cross section of the indus-
tries, where the f-statistics are in parentheses, follows:
X = .388 + .0237 Y R
2 = .0040
(12.789) (.296)
As is evident, the coefficient on the Y variable measuring the unexplained
variability of detrended industry profits is not significantly different from zero.
The debt-asset ratio in various industries, the X variable, is apparently not
influenced, in any significant way, by cyclical risk.
6
It is worthwhile to compare table 6.4 with tables 4 and 5 presented in Ber-
nanke and Campbell. In general, the statistics shown in table 6.4, whether
weighted average, median, or ninetieth percentile, are higher, particularly to-
ward the end of the period, than the ratios exhibited in Bernanke and Camp-
bell. Furthermore, the positive difference cannot be ascribed to the addition
of companies from the Full Coverage and Research files; comparing the In-
dustrial subsample in table 6.4 to the tables in Bernanke and Campbell reveals
the same positive differences. Hence, it must be concluded that the reason for
differences is the use of the aggregate approach, as opposed to an algorithm,
for computing the market value of debt.
6.6 Distributions of the Ratio of Interest Expense to Cash Flow
The next three tables exhibit information about the distribution of the ratio
of interest expense to operating cash flow for the various samples and subsam-
ples.






























































































































































































































Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations.
Cash flow is defined as the sum of before-tax eranings, depreciation, and interest expense. Negative
values of the ratio are considered as + *>.
sample nearly doubled, whether calculated as a weighted average or a median,
over the years 1969-88. The ratio rose, in particular, since 1979. The nine-
tieth percentile of the distribution more than tripled over the entire period.
According to table 6.6, corporate financial conditions worsened noticeably in
the 1981-82, not the 1973-74, recession, and worsened again in 1985 and
1986, when many oil-drilling-equipment and steel companies were experienc-
ing severe difficulties.
A still more somber picture of worsening financial conditions is evident for
the larger fluctuating sample shown in table 6.7. In particular, since 1981, for
more than 10 percent of the companies on the Full Coverage and Research
files, cash flow was negative. For nearly all years, interest expense-cash flow
ratios for companies on the Full Coverage and Research files exceed ratios for
the larger established companies on the Industrial file. The general trend to-
ward higher interest expense-cash flow ratios also is evident in the industry
breakdown shown in table 6.8. Only two industries, laboratory equipment and
apparel, exhibited declining ratios, while the ratios for the electronics, glass
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Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations.
aThe ratio shown is the median of the distribution. The sample here does not match the sample in table
6.7 exactly, owing to the omission of a few small industries.
The increase in the interest expense-cash flow ratio over the sample period
can be caused by higher interest rates, higher debt outstanding, or relatively
lower cash flow. As shown in figure 6.2, the median, for the fluctuating
sample, of the ratio of interest expense to debt outstanding (book value), that
is, the effective interest rate, climbed rapidly through 1981 to nearly 12 per-
cent, reflecting rising market interest rates. After 1982, however, the effective
interest rate declined to about 10 percent by 1988. Hence, through 1982, in-
creases in the ratio of interest expense to cash flow can be attributed, in part,
to rising interest rates. Since 1982, however, because cash flow grew rapidly
in the economic expansion, the sole culprit for the increasing interest ex-
pense-cash flow ratio must be the rapid increase in debt outstanding.
Comparing the results for the fluctuating sample in tables 6.4 and 6.7, the
question naturally arises why the interest expense-cash flow ratio increased
from 1982 to 1988, while the debt-asset ratio remained relatively stable. The223 Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?
simple arithmetic answer is that the ratio of asset prices (primarily through
equity prices) to cash flow rose rapidly over the period. This increase perhaps
reflects the view of stock market participants that future strong growth in earn-
ings and lower interest rates would justify fully a very rapid increase in equity
prices. If the view of the stock market is realized, clearly there need be little
concern about current levels of corporate debt outstanding. If, however, earn-
ings growth were to slow significantly or interest rates were to remain stable,
concerns about debt levels would be warranted.
6.7 Average Ratings of Corporate Bonds Outstanding
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show average ratings of corporate bonds outstanding
for 1978-88. Four different measures of average bond rating were computed
using the COMPUSTAT files. The average rating fell about a grade and a third
over the period, regardless of which of the four measures is used for analysis.
The first two measures (fig. 6.3) are the median and weighted average of
the representative Standard and Poor's bond rating for each company in the
fixed sample of nonfinancial corporations.
8 The median rating in this sample
declined from A in 1978 to BBB in 1988. The average rating, weighted by
long-term debt outstanding, declined from A A to just slightly better than A - .
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
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Fig. 6.2 Ratio of interest expense to debt outstanding (book value), fluctuating
sample
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'Weighted by long-term debt outstanding.
Fig. 6.3 Average rating of corporate bonds outstanding, fixed sample of non-
financial issuers
Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations
Downgradings associated with restructurings and increased access to the junk
bond market by many issuers would seem to be the primary explanations for
the drop in ratings. The average rating is higher than the median, owing to the
existence of a few large issuers with superior bond ratings.
The third and fourth measures (fig. 6.4) are the median and weighted aver-
age of the S&P rating for the fluctuating sample. The median rating for this
sample declined from A in 1978 to BBB- in 1988. The weighted average
rating declined from A A + to slightly better than A over the period.
6.8 Simulations of Recessions
As did Bernanke and Campbell, to get a sense of the potential effects of a
recession on corporate financial structure, I simulated the effects of recessions
like those of 1973-74 and 1981-82. For each firm that existed in the base
year, 1972 or 1980, and in 1988, I computed the percentage changes in the
total market value of the firm (equity and debt) that were observed over the
two years succeeding the base year, denoted recession year 1 and recession
year 2. I also computed the nominal changes in the book value of the firm's
debt and applied these changes, scaled up by the book value of the firm's
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'Weighted by long-term debt outstanding.
Fig. 6.4 Average rating of corporate bonds outstanding, fluctuating sample of
non-financial issuers.
Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations
changes in the market-to-par ratios of 1973, 1974, 1981, and 1982 to the
market-to-par ratio in 1988. I then used the simulated market-to-par ratio to
compute the market value of long-term debt outstanding in the post-1988
recession years. Combining the simulations of market values of debt and as-
sets, it was possible to calculate simulated debt-asset ratios for each firm in
two hypothetical recession years after 1988.
In a similar way, I took the observed change in cash flow (excluding interest
expense) over the recession years, scaled it up by the book value of the firm's
assets, and applied these changes to cash flow (excluding interest expense) in
1988. Simulated interest expense was computed by multiplying the simulated
level of debt outstanding (book value) by a simulated effective interest rate for
each firm in the recession years.
9 In such a manner, it was possible to con-
struct simulated ratios of interest expense to cash flow. The simulations were
done for the fluctuating sample of nonfinancial corporations in the Industrial
and Full Coverage files. The results are reported in table 6.9 for the two years
of the two simulated recessions.
Even more striking than the results reported by Bernanke and Campbell,
the results shown in table 6.9 indicate a significant deterioration in financial
conditions if a recession were to hit. More specifically, as shown in the upper
panel, a repetition of the 1973-74 recession, when the market values of firms226 Mark J. Warshawsky
Table 6.9 Simulations of the Impact of 1973-74 and 1981-82 Recessions on
Corporate Financial Structure Extant in 1988
1973-74 Recession
2 1981-82 Recession"
Weighted 90th Weighted 90th
Average Median Percentile Average Median Percentile
Debt-asset ratio
Base year(1988) .3972 .4083
Recession year 1 .4920 .5587
Recession year 2 .6375 .6834
Ratio of interest expense to cash flow
Base year(1988) .1817 .1722
Recession year 1 .1707 .1818
Recession year 2 .1767 .2162
Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations.
Note: Also see tables 6.4 and 6.7. Negative values are considered as +°°.
aSample consists of 1,173 corporations that reported data in 1972 and 1988.

























plummeted, would push the median debt-asset ratio, at market value, from
.41 to .56 in the first recession year and to an unprecedented level of .68 in
the second recession year. Nearly 25 percent of corporations in the sample
would have debt-asset ratios exceeding one by the second recession year, in-
dicating severe financial troubles. About 22 percent of companies in the In-
dustrial subsample would have debt-asset ratios exceeding one, while about
31 percent of companies in the Full Coverage subsample would have debt-
asset ratios exceeding one. Around 16 percent of total corporate assets would
be in the category of debt-asset ratio exceeding one. A repetition of the 1981—
82 recession, when the stock market was fairly robust, would also lead to
increases in debt-asset ratios, although the increases would be much less se-
vere than in a 1973-74 recession scenario. Nevertheless, nearly 8 percent of
corporations in the sample would have debt-asset ratios exceeding one in the
1981-82 scenario. For the samples used in the simulations, the actual impact
of the 1973-74 and 1981-82 recessions on corporate financial structure are
shown in table 6.10. Except for the weighted-average ratio for the 1981-82
recession, the simulated debt-asset ratios after 1988 shown in the upper panel
of table 6.9 are higher than the actual ratios after 1972 and 1980, shown in the
upper panel of table 6.10.
The simulated ratios of interest expense to cash flow are shown in the bot-
tom panel of table 6.9. For the simulation of the 1973-74 recession, the
weighted-average ratio actually declines as the effective interest rate declines.
The median ratio, however, increases slightly, and the ratio in the ninetieth
percentile increases significantly. About 4 percent of the corporations would
have negative cash flow and a debt-asset ratio exceeding one. For the simula-
tion of the 1981-82 recession, the ratio of interest expense to cash flow, com-227 Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?
puted either as a weighted average or median, increases noticeably in the
recession years. The ratio in the ninetieth percentile is denoted as infinity, as
more than 10 percent of the corporations have negative ratios, owing to nega-
tive cash flows. Again, comparing with the bottom panel in table 6.10, the
simulated interest expense-cash flow ratios after 1988 are uniformly higher
than the actual ratios after 1972 and 1980.
Finally, in table 6.11, the prevalence of corporations with interest expense
exceeding cash flow is indicated, as a percentage of the number of firms in the
sample and as a percentage of total assets. The upper panel shows actual ex-
perience, while the lower panel shows simulations of 1973-74 and 1981-82
recessions based on 1988 data and on the samples available for simulation, as
indicated in table 6.9. As shown in the upper panel, the prevalence of corpo-
rations with interest expense exceeding cash flow has grown significantly, al-
though it is smaller corporations that are predominantly in this category. In
the lower panel, simulations show that both 1973-74 and 1981-82 recessions
would at least double the percentage of assets represented by corporations
with interest expense exceeding cash flow from 1988 levels. By the second
year of a 1981-82 recession, almost 27 percent of corporations, with 6 percent
of corporate assets, would have interest expense exceeding cash flow.
6.9 Conclusions
The findings here tend to support, and even strengthen, the disturbing con-
clusions reached by Bernanke and Campbell. The ratios of debt to assets, at
market value, increased over the period for most samples, subsamples, indus-
try groupings, and statistical measures, although the highs reached in 1974
remain unsurpassed. The ratio of interest expense to cash flow increased sig-
Table 6.10 Actual Experience of the Impact of 1973-74 and 1981-82 Recessions
on Corporate Financial Structure, Samples Used in Simulations*
Debt-asset ratio
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Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations.
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Source: COMPUSTAT and author's calculations.
aSee table 6.7 for sample sizes.
bSee table 6.9 for description of simulation samples.
nificantly, owing to higher effective interest rates through 1982 and increased
levels of debt outstanding through 1988. The current interest expense-cash
flow ratio is at or near the highs reached in 1982 and 1986. Small corporations
tend to have higher ratios, and hence weaker financial conditions, than large
corporations. The median bond rating declined from about A in 1978 to
BBB — in 1988. If a severe recession were to hit, as many as 25 percent of
corporations, corresponding to as much as 16 percent of total corporate assets,
would be placed in severe financial straits, judged by the criterion of simu-
lated debt-asset ratios exceeding one and given the financial structure extant
in 1988. Judged by the criterion of simulated interest expense exceeding sim-
ulated cash flow, as many as 27 percent of corporations, corresponding to
more than 6 percent of corporate assets, would be placed in severe financial
straits in a future severe recession.
Bernanke and Campbell examined the possibility that off-balance-sheet
considerations give corporations the ability to support higher debt burdens. In
particular, they cited arguments advanced by others concerning the emergence
of the junk bond market and of corporate pension overfunding. The junk bond
argument is that these bonds, owing largely to the dominance of certain un-
derwriters, allow issuers and investors to costlessly renegotiate terms rather
than incur the heavy costs of bankruptcy in the event of financial difficulties.229 Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?
The pension fund argument is that high levels of overfunding may have given
corporations the flexibility needed to support heavier debt burdens.
On closer examination, however, these arguments provide little comfort.
Recent defaults by large issuers of junk bonds indicate that bankruptcy is still
a possibility when financial difficulties are encountered. Furthermore, one of
the key arguments used by proponents of corporate restructuring—higher
debt levels force corporate managers to focus on improving efficiency—relies
on the assumption that default is costly and, hence, to be avoided (Jensen
1988). Yet it is also claimed, with little concern for logical consistency, that
insolvency can be handled in a costless manner. And while it is true that the
funding of pension liabilities, in the aggregate, has improved considerably,
many companies still have underfunded pension liabilities (Warshawsky
1989a). Indeed, the 1980s has witnessed the development of another retiree
benefit problem: the rapid rise in unfunded liabilities for retiree health benefits
(Warshawsky 1991). Finally, an explanation sometimes given for the in-
creased leverage of U.S. corporations since 1986 is that tax reform provides
increased private incentives for higher leverage (Warshawsky 1989b). These
private incentives, however, may conflict with the social desire for financial
stability. Hence, available evidence and logical considerations indicate that
some degree of concern about the financial health of the U.S. nonfinancial
corporate sector is appropriate.
Notes
1. Bernanke, Campbell, and Whited (1990) also updated their analysis; they report
few changes in results or conclusions from their earlier paper. They, however, did not
expand their sample, include any new measures of financial health, or reexamine the
book-to-market-value algorithm. In addition, they do not report fully the results of
simulations using 1988 data. The samples in their 1988 and 1990 papers do not match
exactly, owing to the exclusion of those companies from the later paper's sample which
did not restate data to a basis consistent with the new FASB rule requiring consolida-
tion of finance subsidiaries after 1987. In the paper here, I did not use restated data,
and hence there may be a slight inconsistency between data reported before 1988 and
data reported in 1988. The two large companies most affected by the change in the
accounting rule, General Motors and Ford, however, are not included in the fixed
sample nor in the flexible sample in 1988 reported in this paper. More generally, only
44 of the 1,931 companies listed on the COMPUSTAT Industrial file in 1987 had a differ-
ence greater than 10 percent between historical and restated data for long-term debt.
2. The adjusted algorithm was developed initially by Leland Crabbe; further small
revisions were made by Peter Oberkircher.
3. The ratio is calculated based on information reported in successive annual issues
of the New York Stock Exchange Fact Book.
4. This methodological point also has implications for calculations of q ratios for
individual companies.
5. Because observations are entered on a fiscal-year basis and the par-to-market230 Mark J. Warshawsky
adjustment using the aggregate approach is done at the end of the calendar year, for
those corporations whose fiscal year is not the calendar year, a mismatch occurs.
6. The same exercise was done using /?
2's computed from industry profit equations
estimated over the period 1977 through 1986; the results did not differ significantly.
7. Operating cash flow is defined as the sum of after-tax earnings, taxes, deprecia-
tion, and interest expense.
8. The S&P rating system is an ordinal ranking. For the purpose of computations,
the system was enumerated linearly, starting with AAA equal to 2, AA+ equal to 4,
A A equal to 5, and so on.
9. The simulated effective interest rates are computed as the effective interest rate
extant in 1988, adjusted by the nominal changes in effective interest rates over the
recession years.
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